The Baltic International Yearbook of
Cognition, Logic and Communication

March 2026 Volume 16: *Justification, Evidence, and Use/mention errors*
pages 1-15 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4148/1944-3676.1132

JOHN COLLINS
Ikerbasque – University of the Basque Country

USE/MENTION AND ANOTHER HOT MESS

ABSTRACT: Azzouni seeks to identify and resolve a set of use/mention confusions both in general terms and especially as they arise in epistemology. The paper extends Azzouni's insights into linguistic theory, where similair confusions occur and which can be resolved in much the same terms as Azzouni proposes for epistemology.

1. INTRODUCTION

Azzouni's (2025) principal aim is to resolve a collection of putative use/mention confusions in epistemology. I am very sympathetic to the ambition and the means of executing it. My focus, though, will be on Azzouni's basic tools, as it were: the use/mention distinction and a deflated view of propositions. In the spirit of advancing the view, I aim to show how Azzouni's insights shed considerable light on fundamental issues in the philosophy of linguistics. The use I shall make of Azzouni is consistent with Azzouni's (2013) illusory account of our common conception of language, but my concern is not for our intuitive or perceptual take on language, but the representational attributions of linguistic theory.

2. RECONFIGURING USE AND MENTION

The use/mention distinction is most often presented as a linguistic one, but Azzouni (pp. 8-10) correctly notes that the distinction has a more general application. Furthermore, stumbling over the distinction, or just being blind to it, is not solely sourced to our difficulty with speaking or thinking of the inexistent, even if such cases are the go-to examples. Thus, the philosophical naïf is liable to confuse Zeus, as might be, with the idea ZEUS or even the word 'Zeus', because Zeus himself, if you will, is not otherwise available to be thought or spoken about. Such a temptation doesn't arise for our thought and talk about Donald Trump, who is all too palpable. In general terms, though, we might think of use/mention as a distinction between properties a representation has qua a semantic structure with relata and properties a representation has qua a certain kind of syntactic/morphological entity (natural language, formal system, pictogram, etc.).[1] So, a structure in 'use' is *transparent* in that we see through it in order to speak or think about the things the structure is about. This just means that any other structure would equally serve to describe the pertinent portion of the world if it has the same semantic properties. A structure as 'mentioned' is *opaque* in that its semantic properties are not relevant to the truth of the thought/speech, only its syntactic-morphological properties are. The mistake of conflating the two, therefore, is the mistake of attributing properties to the representation that properly belong to the represented. One could make the converse mistake, but such a stumble would be odd given that representations, qua semantic, carry information about the represented, and so can be mistaken for them, especially when the represented are not otherwise readily identifiable (Zeus, numbers, geodesics, etc.). The represented, on the other hand, do not carry information on how they are represented, and can be variably represented. Moreover, the represented are often inaccessible without a representational structure (again, numbers, etc.).

Once we shift perspective from Greek gods or Sherlock Holmes to numbers and other abstracta that earn their explanatory keep by being embedded in certain kinds of theoretical structure, use/mention confusions are not so much less egregious, as nigh-on innocent. In this regard, Azzouni (p. 10) offers what strikes me as an insight along two dimensions:

> We may want to charge physicists and mathematicians with "confusions" of use and mention, or we may want to simply regard it as part of the practice that practitioners seamlessly switch back and forth without notice between considerations of notation and considerations of the properties of the objects the notation designates. (I recommend, of course, the latter position.) Why is this seamless switching back-and-forth without notice possible? The answer: Because… mathematical notation encodes methods of manipulation that correspond to properties/relations of the mathematical objects described by this notation.

The first insight is that the 'confusion' is no kind of real confusion at all, as if mathematics would be improved by an assiduous cleaving to the use/mention distinction.[2] Indeed, the fundamental use of functions and variables makes a slippage almost inevitable. As Dieudonné (1972, p. 102) noted, the mathematician treats 'the unknown (or unknowns) as if it were a known quantity… A modern mathematician is so used to this kind of reasoning that his boldness is now barely perceptible to him'. The thought here is that a variable (a sign for the 'unknown') is *our* bit of mathematic kit, but it is manipulable just like any numeral that stands for something we take to be independent of us (we can take the square root of a variable, multiply it by itself, etc.).

The second insight is that the seamless switching is underpinned by a kind of structural parallelism. As advertised, both points shed some considerable light on disputes concerning the foundations of linguistics and, by implication, other areas of cognitive science. Azzouni's independent view gains not a little credit from this service. The rest of the paper will explain how.

2.1. The putative aboutness of linguistic representations

Let generative linguistic theory be a kosher branch of science. Further, let its explanatory credentials depend upon its attribution of complex representations to speaker-hearers. For present purposes, we may be neutral on just what explanations are relevant, but we may assume that the explananda involve the production and consumption of language (processing), the acquisition of language, and the standing state of a

speaker-hearer's competence with a language, signalled by our peculiar ability to have robust judgement across an indefinitely extendable range about what is and isn't a possible structure of one's language and what each structure may and may not mean.[3]

A philosophical question arises as soon as representations are in the offing: what are such representations *of* or *about*? Insofar as this question must have an answer, we appear to be in the realm of intentionality. This is to say that linguistic theory is in the business of specifying the content or propositions competent speaker-hearers represent such that they may acquire, process, and sustain a knowledge of their language(s). As Fodor (1983, pp. 4–5) puts it:

> What is innately represented [with respect to language] should constitute a bona fide object of propositional attitudes; what's innate must be the sort of thing that can be the value of a propositional variable in such schemas as 'x knows (/believes/cognizes) that P [cf., Fodor 2000, pp. 10–11].

One way or another, this has been the dominant philosophical view of generative linguistics, whether or not the generative project is ultimately endorsed or what qualms about detail might be had.[4] A problem appears to surface, however, when it comes to *what* is represented, whether there is any *what* to represent. Let us consider an example.

Let any competent English speaker-hearer recognise the following, where '*' familiarly means, by hypothesis, that the structure is grammatically ill-formed:

(1) a. The men wanted to leave by themselves
b. * The man wanted to leave by themselves
c. * The men wanted to leave by himself/herself
d. The men/man wanted the women to leave by themselves
e. The men/man wanted the woman to leave by herself

In (1a), who is doing the leaving are the men. (1b–c) are unacceptable, which bear witness to a reflexive pronoun (plural *themselves* or singular *himself/herself*) requiring an antecedent that realises number agreement. We also know that the infinitive 'gap' in (1a) cannot be tacitly filled in

or satisfied by an expression for some salient singular person or salient group; in other words, (1b) can't read as meaning *The men wanted Laura to leave by herself*, no matter how salient Laura might be. In particular, note that number agreement in (1d) is between the reflexive and the infinitive subject, not the matrix subject. Thus, in (1a), the interpretation of the infinitive subject determines the interpretation of the reflexive, but via the matrix subject. The standard generative approach is to explain such facts, in alignment with what else we know of the language, by attributing to the speaker-hearer representations that encode such facts or from which they might be derived.[5] There are two standard notations for such representational contents: brackets and trees. With irrelevant detail elided:

(2) a. $[_{TP}\ [_{DP}$ The men$]\ [_{T'}$ *–ed* $[_{vP}\ \langle$the men$\rangle\ [_{v'}$ want
$[_{TP}$ PRO $[_{T'}$ to $[_{vP}$ leave by themselves$]]]]]]]$

b.



The relevant feature of both structures is the relation realised by the sequence *the men*-PRO-*themselves*. The reflexive must be bound locally (at least within the host maximal projection, TP), which means that PRO fixes its reference, and PRO itself is controlled by an antecedent that c-commands it (in essence, *the men* is the nearest nominal whose dominating node (*v*P) dominates PRO).[6] There are a number of points of philosophical interest here.

First, there is no issue of which notation is better beyond pragmatic

or presentational choices turning on convenience and vividness. The only significant desideratum is that the notation captures relations of dominance/containment, as opposed to linear order, in terms of which generalisations can be framed. For example, c-command, as just intimated, is not a tree-specific concept; it can easily be defined in combinatorial terms that apply to many different notational systems (Epstein et al. 1998).

Secondly, the representations cannot simply be *of* or *about* material construed to be realised outside of the mind. This is for two reasons: (i) the representations contain elements phonologically unrealised (PRO, copies such as ⟨the men⟩) and (ii) the constituency relations have no correspondence to the linear strings of externally individuated 'sentences'.[7]

On the face of it, then, the content attributed by linguistic theory is of the inexistent in the sense that syntactic structure and covert items do not exist beyond their representation, much like Zeus or Sherlock Holmes. Yet, we must retain content here for otherwise we would collapse the use/mention distinction. As we might say, principles to do with reflexive pronouns pertain to NPs and what NPs co-occur with them in the host TP. The principles do not pertain to 'NP's or 'TP's. The generalisations are defined over the categories and structures, not some particular notation, which is, if not exactly arbitrary, at least non-unique. As said above, it would seem as if linguistic theory trades in the kind of structures in (2), which amount to specifications of the contents of speaker-hearers' mental states. At any rate, the content-involvingness of the attributions cannot be denied, even if they have no external correlate, on pain of falling foul of the use/mention distinction (Rey 2003, 2020; Collins 2010).[8]

But this is not a happy pass. Content, if it is not to be simply informational, must be intensional in the sense that it is representation-dependent insofar as representing an entity one way or another matters to the identity of the content. Call this the *intensionality condition* content is asked to satisfy. Furthermore, attributions of content are licensed to the extent that they are explanatorily required. Thus, if linguistic theory really does attribute representations with content of the kind depicted in (2), then this must serve some explanatory purposes. Call this the *explanatory condition* content must meet. The question before us is whether accommodating these two conditions really demands a

notion of content, and, if so, of what kind. I shall argue that Azzouni's peculiar take on content, especially pertaining to the inexistent, leads us to a resolution, at least regarding the explanatory condition.

The intensionality condition ought to be rejected when it comes to the representations attributed by the relevant theories, for notation does *not* matter; all that is important is that the structures support the generalisations that appear to be empirically adequate. There is no question of the same thing being represented in different ways, as if there is a difference between speaker-hearers who represent language via bracketing and those who use trees: the notation is *ours*, not *theirs*. To be sure, there is a sense in which speaker-hearers might parse a 'sentence' with one structure as opposed to another, but that is not an intensionality matter—the matter falls under the explanatory condition. There is not a 'thing' being represented one way as opposed another, but a structural condition upstream of an external string—acoustic or orthographic—being recognised as linguistic at all. We shall get to this.

The explanatory condition cannot be so easily accommodated, for it appears to be uniquely met by content in a number of respects, each pertaining to the fundamental idea that the content linguistic theory specifies needs to be independent of the states that realise it in order for the desired explanations to go through; that is, the contents cannot serve to modify or categorise states (Fodor 1978; Pylyshyn 1984; Rey 2020.

First, generalisations are stated over contents, not their representations (or vehicles). For example, one principle appealed to with respect to (2) is so-called Principle A of binding theory:

(A) A reflexive is locally bound (at least within its clause).

Evidently, the principle is about reflexives and their referential determination, not any particular symbols or vehicles.

Secondly, operations apply to contents. Movement, for instance, is hypothesied to be a general displacement effect whereby projections are interpreted in grammatical positions they do not occupy in the 'surface' structure, hence as if 'moved' from a lower to a higher position, with the former position still within the interpretive scope of the latter position. Thus:

(3) a. Who do you want to succeed?
b. Who do you want Laura to succeed?
c. Who do you want to succeed Jane?
d. * Who do you want Laura to succeed Jane?

Succeed is ambiguous between a transitive and intransitive interpretation, and so *who* can be interpreted in subject or object position. If the subject position is occupied, as in (3b), then *who* is obligatorily read as questioning the object position. If the object position is occupied, as in (3c), then *who* is obligatorily read as questioning the subject position. If both positions are occupied, as in (3d), then the structure is uninterpretable, a 'vacuous quantification'.[9] So, corresponding to (3a), we can posit two underlying structures (irrelevant details elided):

(4) a. $[_{CP}$ Who do $[_{TP}$ you $[_{vP}$ want $[_{TP}$ ⟨who⟩ to succeed]]]]
b. [Which person x][you want x to succeed]

(5) a. $[_{CP}$ Who do $[_{TP}$ you $[_{vP}$ want $[_{TP}$ PRO to succeed ⟨who⟩]]]]
b. [Which person x][you want you to succeed x]

The upshot is that movement, understood here as a kind of copying relation, pertains to the putative content, not the symbol; after all, no symbol, qua sign, is moved anywhere; rather, there is a kind of derivational process that involves the same 'content' being doubled or copied.[10]

Thirdly, linguistic structures are called upon to be multi-modal or to realise a 'common coin', as Rey (2020) calls it (cf., Higginbotham 1987; Collins & Rey 2021). Thus, in some sense, a linguistic item counts as the *same* whether competent speaker-hearers consume (hear, see), understand, or produce it. But these are quite distinct modalities, and so involve very different 'signs' or vehicles. Nonetheless, linguistically speaking, it must be the 'same thing' that can occur in different modalities, if we are to have linguistic cognition in view at all. Hence, sameness here must pertain to content, not symbol.

Suppose the explanatory condition cannot be evaded as the intensionality condition can be. Still, one might think that we get too much from too little; that is, the mere use/mention distinction delivers an attribution of linguistic content to speaker-hearers, but we really don't know what content amounts in general let alone for the kind of abstract

structures exhibited above, of which speaker-hearers are completely ignorant.[11] On the other hand, however, content elimination can appear to depend upon conflating use with mention. Following Azzouni's lead we can see our way through this other hot mess.

3. AZZOUNI TO THE RESCUE

First, consider that if a conflation of use with mention in linguistic theory is a grave error that effectively etiolates its explanatory power, then we should notice it, as it were. As it is, as with the mathematics case, the conflation is almost unavoidable and, in Azzouni's words, 'seamless'. The reason for this, Azzouni suggests, is that a mathematical language is designed to be manipulable in just the ways that track mathematical relations, that amount to a class of invariances independent of any particular notation. Moreover, as indicated, we have no access to mathematical relations be it intellectual or sensuous, beyond some or other system of notation. The use/mention conflation is thus inevitable and (mostly) harmless, the latter because it doesn't tend to lead us to go wrong about mathematics (make mathematical errors). What, then, is content, on such a picture?

Azzouni offers a deflated view of content, even smudging the difference between content and language (propositions and sentences). Still, one can recover the following claim. Let content be the relata properties of a linguistic structure such that the structure is true (/satisfied), if the relata obtain in the right configuration. So, we can think of a propositional/content attribution as involving reference to some worldly situation, the very situation the sentence used describes:

> [T]he specific worldly conglomeration of relations and objects that's *referred to* by "that John is running again" is the same worldly conglomeration of relations and objects *that's described* by the sentence "John is running again." (p. 15).

Content here, however, does not play an intermediary role, as if an attribution were relating an agent to a proposition and only indirectly to the world. On the contrary, the attribution is simply relating the agent to the 'wordly conglomeration of objects and relations'. But what when there is no such conglomeration?

> Whatever it is "that John is running again" refers to (if anything at all), it isn't a proposition; it's either a worldly conglomeration of objects and relations or it's nothing at all, or it's what a worldly conglomeration of objects and relations amounts to when such a conglomeration isn't realized (doesn't exist) (*op cit*.)

Still, when talking about nothing, if you will, it doesn't mean that what is said/thought is false; rather, '[w]hat *is* true is that there are many worldly conglomerations of objects and relations that are why' a proposition might be true, even if not described by them (p. 17). So, the thought that Holmes is smarter than Donald Duck is neither false nor relates the thinker to something other than a conglomeration. Instead, there is a conglomeration, involving, say, stories, movies, etc. that make the thought true, even if neither Holmes nor Donald Duck are described by the thought, for they are nothing at all. In other words, having something contentful stand in for conglomerations when we say/think something false or speak/think about nothing (Holmes, Zeus, etc.) is effectively a use/mention confusion. These morals can be applied to the linguistic case.

Let us assume that linguistic theory attributes representational states to speaker-hearers. The question is what such content amounts to. Can it be deflated as just a reflex of the use/mention distinction? That is, would such a notion be able to support the explanatory condition detailed in the last section? I think so, in which case we really don't get too much from too little, because the explanatory condition itself is suitably deflated as simply pertaining to the relation of a theory to its target phenomena.

So, first off, following Azzouni, let us assume that linguistic attributions do not depict speaker-hearers as relating to propositions or proposition-like entities. Here we depart from Fodor (1983, 2000). The attribution of a proposition, rather, specifies relata to which the speaker-hearer stands such that the attribution is true, if the conglomeration as described obtains, or some other conglomeration, not described, obtains, but which is such as to explain why the proposition is true. So what do the kind of structures describe that linguistic theory attributes to speaker-hearers?

They do not describe worldly conglomerations, for syntactic struc-

ture and semantic properties are not 'out there' in the world. All that is plausibly worldly is linear sequences of morphemes, or acoustic waves, orthographic sequences, etc. Nor would it be correct to think of the contents as being 'purported conglomerations', to use Azzouni's expression, for no-one is purporting any such thing. Further, it would be incorrect to think of the representations as false, precisely because they do not purport to describe a worldly conglomeration. What we can say, however, is that from the theorist's perspective, the contents are meant to track states of the speaker-hearer without describing such states as containing entities corresponding to the features of the representations. In this sense, linguistic representations are akin to how Azzouni (2010) treats fictions. The attributions are made true by states of the speaker-hearer that don't feature entities to correspond to the features of the representations. Unlike fiction, broadly speaking, we simply don't know what makes the representations true, because we don't know the relevant architecture of the human brain. We can, though, still understand the representations as true without knowing why, simply because they are, *ex hypothesi*, empirically adequate. Hence it is that use/mention is inevitable and harmless, because we have no access to the structures underlying language other than via the formal notions we develop within our theories.

The three components of the explanatory condition fall into place. First, it is true that principles are defined over contents, not vehicles, but all this means is that the principles are part of the theory along with the structures. The vehicles that would stand in contrast to the theoretical conditions would be either notational, but no good principles will be notation-bound, or the relevant brain states, but their character is unknown.

Secondly, principles, such as those involving movement, do relate structures to one another derivationally, but, again, this is an aspect of the theoretical framework and not dependent on a choice of notation. A natural way to think of this is that derivations within a formal system are employed to track state transitions in the target system, or merely encode information. Thus, we explain the natural system by relating it to a formal system that explicitly states various conditions we take the natural system to meet and explicitly details what follows from these conditions.[12]

Thirdly, whether linguistic theory defines a 'common coin' is not obvious. What is required for a full account of a speaker/hearer's capacity for language is a set of interface conditions so that there are 'laws' relating syntax, morphology, phonology, morphology, semantics, and more. But these relations do not have to involve morphology 'seeing' syntax, as it were, or phonology 'seeing' semantics. All that needs to be established is that conditions realised in one system (syntax, say) constrain how another system operates. Thus, in a very real sense, speaker-hearers do not produce the very same thing they consume, but it appears as if there is such a common coin only because there are constraints holding between the systems so that the relations between syntax, morphology, and the rest are not accidental. Thus, what holds in one domain impacts on the others with such lawfulness it is as if the same thing occurs.[13]

4. CONCLUSION

Azzouni's work on reference, fiction, and ontology is the best account philosophy has to offer of the shape of these concepts in relation to our ordinary thought and talk. The work doesn't need to do further duty, but it does in resolving quandaries arising in linguistic theory, or, better, linguistic meta-theory. That, at any rate, is what I hope to have shown.[14]

Notes

[1]Throughout, I shall assume that no relevant issues arise between the contents and their representations being structured complexes or simplex entities.

[2]This is not to say that all and any use/mention conflations in mathematics or elsewhere are innocent. One might consider the slow development of the basic ideas in calculus as being in part due to use/mention confusions over functions, variables, and the rest (Boyer 1959).

[3]This is not to suggest that normal speakers' judgments are not liable to 'error', a divergence between what follows from their underlying competence and how a structure is interpreted. Thus, competence is not simply intuitive judgment.

[4]See, for example, Katz 1981; Soames 1984; Pylyshyn 1991; Devitt 2006; Rey 2003, 2020.

[5]Much the same issues that will be discussed arise for non-generative approaches too insofar as properties of a string, understood as a sequence of morphemes, are not sufficient to explain the relevant facts about pronominal binding, the interpretation of infinitive subject positions, etc.

[6]The status of control phenomena and the covert pronominal item PRO are highly controversial (for an overview, see Landau 2013). Much the same issues will arise, however,

whatever theory is adopted (whether, say, PRO is really a copy of its antecedent), so my somewhat conservative approach does not unduly prejudice how we ought to think of the conceptual issues.

[7]For example, in linear terms, there is no way to distinguish between a modifier that applies to a conjunction and one that applies to the first member of a conjunction, but the two structures are quite distinct:

(i) a. Mad [dogs and Englishmen]…

b. [Mad dogs] and Englishmen…

Indeed, the ambiguity of the linear sting is predicted by a combinatorial system that generates hierarchical structures that receive a linear spell out.

[8]Rey's (2020, p. 329) preferred example is distinctive features in phonology, whereby a phoneme is represented as a matrix of features pertaining to the vocal cavity, such as [+voice], [-nasal], etc. If one took such features to be representations (presumably brain states), then, absurdly, phonology would appear to be placed in the mind instead of the vocal cavity. But this line of reasoning is mistaken. Phonemes are understood to be abstract in the sense of covering a range of events in the vocal cavity (so-called allophones). Thus, it makes no sense to think of a phoneme or a distinctive feature as picking out a sound or event. It is better to think of a distinctive feature as being a kind of instruction, which can be executed in a number of different ways.

[9]The question here is not whether vacuous quantification is *logically* illicit, but only with whether the language allows for it. Thus, *Who does Laura love Jane?* could be 'regimented' as:

(i) Which person is such that Laura loves Jane?,

which might be correctly answered by the name of anyone, if Laura loves Jane, and if Laura doesn't love Jane, no answer would be correct. But such readings are not licensed by natural language.

[10]During a certain period, movement was theorized as producing a trace, much like a bound variable (*locus classicus*, Chomsky 1981). Copying is not only a more minimal operation, but also finds some empirical support with respect to so-called 'reconstruction' effects. The points I am presently making, however, are unaffected by any choice between traces and copies, which for many purposes can be seen as notational variants.

[11]The concern here is not animated by the thought that content in general *must* be conscious; the worry, rather, is that what linguistic content a speaker-hearer is representing is wholly theoretical at the relevant level of analysis, and so we have no sense of what is represented beyond the development of theory.

[12]One long-standing dispute is over the status of derivations within linguistic theory: whether they are real in the sense of having an empirical signature, or merely notational. If the latter, then, without loss, all of the content of a derivational theory should be able to be mapped onto a theory that simply states conditions, much as any recursive definition can be formulated as an explicit definition. For discussion, see Brody 2003, Uriagereka 2002, and Chomsky 2000.

[13]Such reasoning is exemplified in many areas such as the derivation of linear order for phonology from hierarchical syntax via independent algorithms (Kayne 1994; Cinque 2023).

[14]My thanks go to Jody Azzouni for many discussions about reference, fiction, and the rest, which has been ever so valuable to me. I also thank Georges Rey and Nick Allott

for much back and forth on these issues. This work was funded by Eusko Jauralitza [IT1537-22] and Ikerbasque, Basque Foundation for Science [HORIZON-MSCA-COFUND-2022-101126600-SmartBrain3]

References

Azzouni, Jody. 2010. *Talking about Nothing: Numbers, Hallucinations, and Fictions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738946.001.0001.

——. 2013. *Semantic Perception: How the Illusion of a Common Language Arises and Persists*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199967407.001.0001.

——. 2025. 'Use and Mention with Respect to 'Know,' 'Believe,' 'Evidence,' 'Justification,' 'Hypothesis,' and so on: A Hot Mess'. *Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic, and Communication* 16: 1–70. https://doi.org/10.4148/1944-3676.1130.

Boyer, Carl. 1959. *The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development*. New York: Dover.

Brody, Michael. 2003. *Towards an Elegant Syntax*. London: Routledge, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203986691.

Chomsky, Noam. 1981. *Lectures on Government and Binding: The Pisa Lectures*. Dordrecht: Foris, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110884166.

——. 2000. 'Minimalist inquiries: The framework'. In Roger Martin, David Michaels & Juan Uriagereka (eds.) 'Step by Step: Essays on Minimalist Syntax in Honour of Howard Lasnik', 89–155. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Cinque, Guglielmo. 2023. *On Linearization: Toward a Restrictive Theory*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/14681.001.0001.

Collins, John. 2010. 'Representations without representa: Content and illusion in linguistic theory'. In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.) 'Semantics and Beyond: Philosophical and Linguistic Inquiries', 27–64. Berlin: de Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110362480.27.

Collins, John & Rey, Georges. 2021. 'Chomsky and intentionality'. In Nicholas Allott, Terje Lohndal & Georges Rey (eds.) 'A Companion to Chomsky', 488–502. Oxford: Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119598732.ch31DigitalObjectIdentifier(DOI).

Devitt, Michael. 2006. *Ignorance of Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, https://doi.org/10.1093/0199250960.001.0001.

Dieudonné, Jean. 1972. 'Abstraction in mathematics and the evolution of algebra'. In William Lamon (ed.) 'Learning and the Nature of Mathematics', 102–103. Chicago: SRA Associates.

Epstein, Samuel, Groat, Erich, Kawashima, Ruriko & Kitahara, Hisatsugu. 1998. *A Derivational Approach to Syntactic Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195111149.001.0001.

Fodor, Jerry. 1978. 'Propositional attitudes'. *The Monist* 61: 501–524. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist197861444.

——. 1983. *The Modularity of Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4737.001.0001.

——. 2000. *The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4627.001.

0001.
Higginbotham, James. 1987. 'The autonomy of syntax and semantics'. In Jay L. Garfield (ed.) 'Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding', 119–131. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4735.003.0011.
Katz, Jerrold. 1981. *Language and Other Abstract Objects*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
Kayne, Richard. 1994. *The Antisymmetry of Syntax*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Landau, Idan. 2013. *Control in Generative Grammar: A Research Companion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139061858.
Pylyshyn, Zenon. 1984. *Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2004.001.0001.
——. 1991. 'Rules and representations: Chomsky and representational realism'. In Asa Kasher (ed.) 'The Chomskyan Turn', 231–251. Oxford: Blackwell.
Rey, Georges. 2003. 'Chomsky, intentionality, and a CRRT'. In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.) 'Chomsky and His Critics', 105–139. Oxford: Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470690024.ch5.
——. 2020. *Representation of Language: Philosophical Issues in a Chomskyan Linguistics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198855637.001.0001.
Soames, Scott. 1984. 'Linguistics and psychology'. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 7: 155–179. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00630811.
Uriagereka, Juan. 2002. *Derivations: Exploring the Dynamics of Syntax*. London: Routledge, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203994504.