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Roots of traditional progressivism still offer the best basis of building a sound view of education.

Educational theory in the remainder of the century

By Jerome A. Popp

As we enter the 1980s it seems appropriate to reflect upon the nature of our inquiry—as it was, is, and should be in the future. I want to suggest that it is time to seriously reconsider the tenets of educational progressivism. I will not be suggesting that we simply identify educational progressivism as it existed in the first 20 years of this century and reinstate it in the last 20 years; what I hope to show is that the roots of traditional progressivism still offer the best basis for building a sound view of education for now and the future. It behooves us to view our work as growing out of traditional progressivism and toward a neoprogressivism.

1. The Present Scene

At this time we can look around and find: "humanistic education"—the "hands off" view of pedagogy and schooling—wobbling without a clear direction. Perhaps its followers have made their points and are now at a loss as to what to do next. This is plausible, for humanistic doctrine is philosophically thin, lacking the comprehensiveness or penetration to support prolonged action. I shall return to this view in the third section of the present paper.

The transmissionist or impositional view—humanism's historical adversary—seems to be healthy with educational technology, i.e., the technology of pedagogical imposition, continuing to attract great audiences. The brutality of imposition reflected in the Hoosier's School Master's reading, 'riting, and 'rithmetic taught to the tune of a hickory stick, seems to be in vogue

again in "back to basics." It seems to me that the transmission view with its ever-present technology is presently in position of the greatest momentum with regard to schooling and school policy-making. If we educationists allow the present trend to fulfill itself we can expect to find impositional theory dominating the 1980s.

Optimists will say that humanistic education is less noticeable at present because many of its principles have become internalized by the establishment. Yet anyone who is at all sensitive to the notion of logical consistency must doubt this; how can humanistic principles be internalized by teachers who are taking more and more of an educational technological view of things?

If impositionism is to continue to dominate pedagogical practice, then we must be prepared to accept its consequences. In modern social life, more than any other time in human history, **imposition** is met with **resistance**. Conceptually, imposition and resistance are reciprocal notions. When you are imposed upon, you resist; when school children and young adults are imposed upon they resist. The transmission theory and its supported practice clearly identifies imposition. We are less familiar with its reciprocal resistance. But let us examine it.

Resistance can take two basic forms: active and passive. Active resistance attempts to disrupt the imposition, weakening its impact. Passive resistance allows imposition to manifest itself but seeks to lessen its impact by giving it no target. In school, active resisters are "discipline problems," while passive resisters are "motivation problems." School authority knows how to deal with active resistance. But passive resistance is enigma. Passive resistance draws no punishment, just ignorat. Yet, passive resistance has its price—it's boring.

Recent attention has focused upon the use of drugs by secondary, junior high and even elementary students. It is not possible that through the use of drugs the docility required by transmissional imposition becomes bearable? As far as I can determine, no drug usage studies exist which consider the type of pedagogy as an independent variable. Yet, is it not plausible that drug usage is rendered effective given the impositional nature of the schooling environment? This is a significant area of empirical research which, as I see it, deserves our attention in the 1980's. If, as I am suggesting, drug usage is patterned according to pedagogical imposition, then this alone is evidence against impositionism in schooling.

2. The Transmission View of Schooling

There has always been with us, from Protagorus to Gagne, a transmission view of pedagogy and schooling. If one asks the average adult or undergraduate, "What are the purposes of the school or teaching?" one invariably receives a traditional transmissionist account of the ends of schooling. This tradition is quite strong and dominates, as near as I can tell, the thinking of the typical person. Yet, transmissionism has not remained static and was noticeably modified at the midpoint of this century. For this reason it is best to review transmissionism in two parts: traditional and modern.

Traditional Transmissionism

In the time of the ancients, there were established cultural facts and values into which children could be **initiated**. Since the content transmitted was stable and noncontroversial, the initiation process seemed straight forward. By the late nineteenth century, John Dewey

challenged this process. His classic **Democracy and Education** and his equally important **Interest and Effort in Education**, both published in the second decade of the twentieth century, constituted formidable opposition to straight transmissionism.

The end of transmissionism, (i) a body of knowledge and skill, and (ii) standards of conduct, whether pursued by the "Effort Theory" (or formal discipline) or the "Interest Theory" (or sugar coating the bitter pill) was attacked by Dewey in the classic argument that the object was assumed to be apart and alien to the developing child, and that all experience with children denied this assumption. As an alternative view, a new view of schooling was propounded—progressive education.

While Dewey's arguments keep traditional transmissionism on the ropes for the first third of the twentieth century—it was never knocked out—the extreme child-centered wing of the Progressive Education Association undermined his attack. After all, if the project of study was part of the child's nature, why not keep hands-off and let things unfold according to nature's plan? Dewey's attack on the impositionism of the transmission view ironically cleared the way for permissivism. Dewey, of course, was attacking both impositionism and the romantic hands-off approach when he claimed "psychologized" the child. Yet when one reads his words today, the attack upon the impositionism of transmission thinking seems to receive the heaviest blows.

Modern Transmissionism

At midcentury Ralph Tyler laid out his curriculum technology and it received a strong positive response. There had been earlier transmissionists who sought efficiency, but by Tyler's time there seemed to be less opposition. Tylerian technology sought to improve outcomes by improving means.

A decade later **The Process of Education** appeared, which of course originated "the structure of the disciplines movement" in curriculum development. If we could clarify the ends, the means would follow. Aim for the basic structure, and children will be released somehow to become little scientists and mathematicians. Child psychologists were out and Ph.D.'s from the disciplines were in. It is as if the arts and sciences professors had finally won over professors of education, and they walked with arrogance through the captured public schools.

Yet things did not go as predicted. In 1971 Bruner, in "The Process of Education Revisited," took it all back.

I believe I would be quite satisfied to declare, if not a moratorium, then something of a de-emphasis on matters that have to do with the structure of history, the structure of physics, the nature of mathematical consistency, and deal with it rather in the context of the problems that face us.'

If Einstein could ask Newton's forgiveness for being right, Bruner should have asked for Dewey's for being wrong.

While the structure of the disciplines movement has faded in science and mathematics, it is somewhat alive in philosophy. From Kohlberg's moral development theory and Lipman's Philosophy for Children movement, one expects to find some teachers viewing value and/or moral education the way the structure of the disciplines teachers viewed their subjects. I am not claiming that

Kohlberg or Lipman and their theoretical associates are "Jonnie-come-lately's" to Brunerism. This is not the case. But I am concerned that some users of these ideas may fall into the same view as the earlier Brunerites; namely, some may come to view their task as trying to get the student to discover or build the basic structures of moral reasoning like math and physics were supposed to be built. Whether we should have moral curricula, or what form they should take is not my point: I only want to warn against making the same mistakes contained in the structure of the disciplines approach—thinking that curriculum organization and materials are all that are required, while ignoring educational psychology and teacher effectiveness research.

By the late 1960's, behaviorism and educational technology (actually pedagogical technology) were growing strong. As the structure of the disciplines movement faded, the void in the foundations of transmissionism was filled with behaviorist technology. Transmissionism was back to looking at its means again with the ends becoming of less concern. Philosophers will consider the behaviorist version of transmissionism its most acceptable form, for it emphasizes individual differences in its principle that what is reinforcing for one may not be so for another, and for its emphasis on positive reinforcement and banishment of punishment. At present, behaviorism seems alive and well. I shall return to it later.

3. The Romantic View of Schooling

An alternative to the transmission view, romantic permissivism, views childhood as complete in and of itself, requiring not active intervention but protection from intervention; 'intervention' is equated with 'imposition'. The earlier forms of romanticism and its unfolding view of human development are familiar. Romanticism is often accused of being based upon a biological growth metaphor, but this is inaccurate for there was no metaphor intended. Currently the romantic conception of pedagogy has taken two forms: "humanistic" education and developmentalism.

Humanistic Education

Humanistic education, as it is erroneously labeled, is said to derive from third force psychology. Maslow has led the way with Rogers contributing somewhat, and Combs influencing curriculum theory. Maslow is a neo-Aristotleian with self-actualization as the Final Cause for persons; philosophically this brand of determinism will simply not wash. It leads to all sorts of blunders such as confusions over the meaning of 'can' and 'ought', and the role and nature of free choice. His "hierarchy of needs" grounds his straight-line determinism, making the evaluations of alternative directions unnecessary. In surely one of his most absurd moments he equates the development of a child with that of a flower and kitten. I will not embarrass you with an analysis of this absurdity.

K.P. Morgan once referred to Schwab as the Pied Piper of Curriculum theory,² but I have another candidate: Arthur W. Combs. As he recently put it, "The Humanistic Movement . . . is a revolution in human thought, a necessary occurrence in the sweep of human events."³ We, of course, do not know the historical scope of this neoenlightenment. But it seems to be third force enlightenment. As he sees it, we are faced with a choice between two systems of thinking: one open, one closed. We are at a fork in the road. We, in education, always seem to be at a fork or a crossroad; actually, I think we are, and have been

for some time, on a rotary.

The choice between two alternatives "commits us to quite different philosophical positions." The closed system depends upon a "management class," a "great man" . . . "who knows where the people should go," and a "dictatorship." "Open systems are egalitarian . . . essentially democratic." In fact, as Combs puts it,

From my point of view one of the comforting things about dealing with problems from an open system is its congruence with the democratic philosophy. My psychology is not basically out of touch with my philosophy.⁴

Of course Combs is committing the either/or fallacy, but what is interesting is that he knows it. He quotes Kelly: "Whenever you find ideas expressed at opposite ends of a continuum in either/or fashion, it is almost certain they are both wrong."⁵ Ignoring Kelly's confusion of degree and kind, we find Combs agreeing with Kelly (which is to agree with confusion) and nevertheless continuing to discuss his either/or reality.

Without belaboring the argument, I want to simply state that the so-called humanistic movement in education is without intellectual leadership.

Developmentalism

The word 'development' under Piaget's influence has taken on a special meaning. 'Development' suggests to most educationists 'developmentalism'. The latter is a hybrid form of innatism. Piaget is a neo-Kantian. Kant viewed the mind as innately structured in his doctrine of synthetic *a priori* truths. Piaget objects claiming that Kant was talking about the most mature minds. But these structures are not in place at birth. Rather, they develop in three or four distinct stages.

But why do they develop? Children encounter experience and sooner or later become disequibrated. Their cognitive structures do not work well at explaining experience. This does not depend on individual purposes. Disequilibrium is solely biological—a dysfunctional organism-environment relationship.


How do these structures develop? Through assimilation and accommodation equilibration is reestablished. Assimilation is the process of coming at experience. It is what the person can do or make of the environment. Accommodation is what the environment makes of the person. Through accommodation one modifies one's structures, producing more adequate assimilations. Empiricists erred, according to Piaget, in believing that accommodation could go on without its complementary assimilations. Kant erred in the opposite direction by focusing on assimilation and omitting the point that accommodation was also going on. We might say that Kant discovered assimilation process through his trying to accommodate rationalist and empiricist thinging, while Piaget discovered accommodation by trying to assimilate both Kant's thinking and children's thinking.

Philosophically, Piaget is a neo-Kantian committed to synthetic *a priori* truths. Within contemporary philosophy of science and philosophy of mind this is untenable. He ignores the synthetic and analytic *functions* of beliefs. I believe that this omission is generated by his rejection of human purpose and his complete dependence on biology as the basis of knowing. The issues here are historically wide and philosophically deep, and cannot be settled in this or any other short paper. All I want to establish is that Piagetian theory is based upon a rationalistic conception

of mind. Serious educational theorists should not commit to Piaget's views or suggestions without careful philosophical analysis of Piaget's basic assumptions.⁶ The further analysis of Piaget has to be a high agenda item for the 1980s.


4. Traditional Progressivism

Under Dewey the progressive alternative took its basic shape. As I read him he sought to give a systematic, comprehensive, consistent account of the student, pedagogy, curriculum content, and the school and its social context. In other words, he envisioned educational theory as giving an account of four factors, which may be thought of as follows:



To ignore any one of these four was to court disaster.

But how can these factors be approached theoretically? Dewey's account of educational theory was based upon three fundamental theoretical factors: education, democracy and inquiry. Again I will present a bit of geometry.



Education is, of course, the highest value by which all else is to be evaluated. The criterion of growth is the theoretical absolute by which all else is measured. This, by the way, is what the psychological humanism of the 1970s was in its feeble way trying to get at but could not because of its ignoral of philosophy. Education was achieved, according to Dewey, by inquiry on the personal level and democracy on the social level. Only under the conditions of democracy is adequate inquiry possible; but this was not the argument. Only under democratic conditions could the criterion of growth be fully achieved. Democracy frees both education and inquiry. Democracy provides the social conditions for education, which frees inquiry, which allows for the reconstruction of experience . . . , i.e., education.

Through philosophical analysis, Dewey tried to elaborate the nature of these three theoretical factors. Many of his writings are well-known, but, it seems, poorly understood. If I may be so brash to criticize in a few

lines his over thirty books and thousands of papers, I want to suggest that his weaknesses are to be found in two areas; one of which I give him no responsibility—in fact he contributed very positively to it, and another which I attribute to him great responsibility. The first of these is educational psychology. Dewey was not practicing science yet he gave it many important ideas. At Dewey's time educational psychology was just emerging under Thorndike who was, of course, a transmissionist. No educational psychology was on the scene which was based upon progressive assumptions. Dewey was developing the progressive theory, but he could hardly be expected to develop it in all areas.

The second weakness in progressivism was of his making. In his desire to put together all that was separate he went, in my view, too far in his account of inquiry. As Chuck Brauner observes, before 1911 Dewey viewed inquiry as being of two pieces: one which served practical purposes and one which served scientific purposes. But by 1929, "Dewey welded those two approaches to experimentation into a new approach to the idea of a discipline of education."⁷ Contemporary logic questions the sagacity of this approach. Some philosophers of science want to render asunder what Dewey sought to put together: theoretical and practical wisdom. As I shall argue, this approach has warrant. In current educational research there is a good deal of interest in separating theoretical and "evaluation" studies. This distinction by the way has been much clearer than the old basic/applied distinction ever was.

5. Sources of a Neo-Progressivism

Stated negatively, the transmission and romantic views give us an impetus to seek alternatives. More positively, the weaknesses in traditional progressive thinking are at present remedial. Contemporary psychology and philosophy, in my view, offer possibilities for reconstructing progressivism. As Ryle once said of Hume, many have mistaken his footsteps for his destination, one could also say this of Dewey.

Psychological Sources

Psychological thinking during the golden age of progressivism was bifurcated into behaviorism and what Dewey called "psychologizing" the child by various forms of animism. Behaviorism has continued to grow reaching full maturity under B.F. Skinner. G.H. Mead once commented that behaviorism was part of the "stimulus for a pragmatic philosophy."⁸ There has always been an affinity between behaviorism and pragmatism; however, the two part company on the question of the role of human purpose and the related notion of consciousness in explaining behavior. Pragmatism viewed behaviorism as too narrow and hence incomplete.

Within the development of psychology, there has developed an alternative form of behaviorism which departs from the basic tradition from Watson to Skinner. Bandura's "Social Learning Theory" represents a refinement of Toulman's "purposive behaviorism" which was itself a psychological theory more in line with progressivism. I believe that Bandura's approach to psychology offers a scientific study of behavior which is based upon a metaphysics which is consistent with the earlier progressive views of human nature. Furthermore, I believe that Bandura's views offer us a scientific view of learning and experience which can provide for the development of a progressive theory of education. The earlier progres-

sivism's educational psychology was adumbrated but never developed into an ongoing area of scientific inquiry. I am claiming that Bandura provides us with this actualized inquiry. Thus, a soft spot in traditional progressivism is presently remedial. Bandura's Social Learning Theory bolsters progressive thinking and fills a gap which Dewey had to accept—but which we no longer have to.

In his recent book, *Social Learning Theory*, Bandura briefly discusses the alternative conceptions of social interaction. This attempt seems to clarify the nature of social interaction as it functions as a basic metaphysical framework for his scientific endeavors. He claims that, "behavior, other personal factors, and environmental factors all operate as interlocking determinants of each other."

A valid criticism of extreme behaviorism is that, in a vigorous effort to avoid spurious inner causes, it has neglected determinants of behavior arising from cognitive functioning . . . Because some of the inner causes involved by theorists over the years have been ill-founded does not justify excluding all internal determinants from scientific inquiry.⁹

Bandura is attempting to broaden the behaviorist framework by opening the metaphysical *locus standi* to the existence of "internal" factors without explaining behavior in terms of antecedents as various innatist theories do. He is searching for an organism-environment relationship which is not one dimensional as are both environmentalist and antecedent accounts. Note how this view is congruent with the hyphenated reality view held by Dewey. That is, Dewey rejected both the innatist or antecedents view, and the radical environmentalist view of how behavior is explained. Innatism locates the determinants of behavior within the organism, while environmentalism places these solely within the environment. Dewey argued that behavior is best explained by appeal to, and the analyses of, the relationships which form between the organism and the environment of that organism. Consciousness is one of these relationships between an organism and a part of the environment or "situation," as Dewey called it. Purpose is another. It seems to me that it is precisely this explanatory methodology which Bandura and his associates are investigating.

My purpose here is not to review and critique Social Learning Theory from a progressive point of view. All I want to do is to indicate how this theory enhances traditional progressivism. My argument is stronger, however, than simply showing the theoretical compatibility of Bandura and Dewey. Social Learning Theory is worthy of our attention for other reasons.

Skinner, in his behaviorist analysis of ordinary language (*About Behaviorism*, 1974), admits the existence of reflective thinking but claims that it is covert behavior which is modeled on overt behavior. "The words used to describe covert behavior are the words acquired when behaving publicly." Skinner also claims that the observation of covert behavior is easy but does not tell us just how this is to be accomplished. For all of his careful analysis of many terms used in and around psychology, he says very little about covert behavior. Skinner's push for logical completeness seems to be having the effect of revealing an incompleteness in his theory, and possibly opening up radical behaviorism to the arguments of traditional progressivism. Behaviorism is thus by no

means an unassailable alternative to progressive theory.

The other contemporary alternative to the progressive metaphysical framework is the antecedent view of human nature (alias: innatism, romantic psychology, humanistic psychology, preformationism, and developmentalism). As I have indicated, the "humanistic" theoretical foundations lack cogency, and the developmentalism of Piaget is based on a philosophy which has always had its embarrassments. In other words, either direction which the antecedent view has taken leads into the teeth of traditional philosophical objections. Stated differently, of the three traditional possibilities for philosophy of psychology, rationalism, empiricism, and pragmatism, pragmatic psychology is by no means any weaker than its alternatives (objective empiricism or behaviorism and subjective empiricism or "humanism"), and I believe that Social Learning Theory is, as a form of neoprogessivism, a good deal stronger. In other words, the psychological basis of neoprogessivism is now emerging.

Philosophical Sources

As I have already indicated, I believe that the main weakness in Dewey's philosophy was his movement in logic away from his earlier distinction between practical and epistemic ends for inquiry. His holding to the ultimate value, growth, in no way undermines the warrant for separating two distinct kinds of thinking. Obviously we expect that theoretical thinking will observe the criterion of growth (growth in theory); but it is also possible to view practical inquiry as also respecting the criterion of growth—thus, producing practical growth. It will be remembered that in **Experience and Education** Dewey argued that no other requirements need be added to the notion of growth to justify or warrant a line of development; the criterion of growth was both necessary and sufficient. This argument—the argument from education or growth—separates Dewey from the maturationist or antecedent views of educational theory, neo-Aristotleians like Maslow and neo-Kantians like Piaget, and clearly establishes an alternative orientation or framework for educational theory. My point is that while the criterion of growth is both necessary and sufficient for judging the worthwhileness of any line of development, it does not make any line of development the only warranted one. Development can take many legitimate forms; that is, whether a child decides to become a physician, a teacher, a nuclear engineer, or an administrator, the criterion of growth is satisfied if and only if what one learns or what habits one forms allow for continued growth. This is not a philosophy of specialization. The professions, at present, are all reviewing themselves and finding that they have interpreted their roles too narrowly. Dental students are, for example, being told that they do not work solely on teeth, and that they must consider how the **patient** thinks and feels. The practice of dentistry requires the continued growth in the techniques of dentistry of course, but it also requires growth in the knowledge and understandings of one's patients' environmental situations.

Within the context of educational inquiry, the criterion of growth can be adhered to without forcing all inquiry into one methodology. Theoretical and practical inquiry are distinguishable, and this distinction does no violence to the foundations of pragmatism. In fact Dewey's failure to retain this distinction led him to describe in his **Sources of a Science of Education**, 1929, a meth-

odology which was quite inhibiting to the growth of the science of pedagogy.

In several papers I have tried to show that some of the arguments from philosophy of science aimed at the riddle of induction have great significance for how we view our work in education.¹⁰ The arguments given by Levi and Maxwell—which I call the Levi-Maxwell thesis¹¹—make it very clear that epistemic goals or ends require methods quite different from those required for the successful pursuit of practical goals. Since I have reviewed these arguments within the context of pedagogical research elsewhere,¹² I will here only briefly describe this approach.

What Maxwell succeeded in doing was to show us how to deal with the problems of selecting and modifying a metaphysical framework within which empirical science may be profitably conducted. Maxwell argues against Kuhn and Popper holding that it is possible to reconstruct our assumptions about rationality in light of our research experience with them. He specifies the rules for so doing in his "metamethodology." These rules grow out of his view of science as aim-oriented; or in Levi's words, "the aims of inquiry control the legitimacy of inferences." Thus, for both Levi and Maxwell, science must constantly be re-evaluating its goals or ends in light of scientific experience with them. Maxwell goes beyond Levi, in showing us how metaphysical assumptions are necessary for, but controlled within, scientific inquiry.

It is clear from this literature that Levi and Maxwell are working with a means-ends analysis of science, and are properly seen in the tradition of pragmatic philosophy. They have developed a neopragmatic analysis of scientific inquiry. Their arguments have a fairly direct bearing upon the direction and foundations of both empirical educational research and philosophy of education. Since progressivism in educational theory historically rested upon pragmatist conceptions of psychology and philosophy, and since there is warrant to claim that the Levi-Maxwell thesis offers a neopragmatic foundation of scientific inquiry, I believe that there is reason to hold that the foundations for a neoprogessivism in educational theory are at this time in place rendering a neoprogessive view of education and schooling readily producible. The required neoprogessive philosophy is now in place.

6. Conclusion

I have tried to show the serious educationist that there are good reasons to give attention to a neoprogessive theory of education. Ideas rooted in Dewey and enhanced by current research in psychology and philosophy provide the raw materials for us to begin to carve out a new conception of schooling for the 1980s which is worthy of a nation which has given leadership to the world in both science and democracy. The conditions are such that to view the earlier progressivism as nothing more than history, reflects an ignorance of both the past and the present. The future which this ignorance can write is not worthy of us. The intellectual elements are at hand to allow us—if we are really desirous and willing to make the great effort—to recast the schools, teaching, studying, and administration into forms where children and young adults will want to go to school, study, and inquire; where teachers will want to meet their classes and tell their medical and legal counterparts that they are **public school teachers**; where principals and superintendents will smile at their students and teachers, and not be asking whether more armed guards are required to walk

their halls; where parents will see the schools they pay dearly for as centers for inquiry and not the narcotics market place. I put it to you that these things can be; but we, the educational theorists, will have to let them be through our coming to grips with what the present offers us.

Notes

- ¹ Jerome S. Bruner, "The Process of Education Revisited," *Phi Delta Kappan*, September, 1971, p. 21 (Bruner's emphasis).
- ² K.P. Morgan, "A Pied Piper of Curriculum Development: An Examination of the Work of Joseph Schwab," *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society*, 1972, pp. 113-125.
- ³ Arthur W. Combs, "A Choice of Futures," Presented at the Sidney M. Jourard Memorial Conference: New Frontiers of Humanistic Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, January, 1976.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ See Rottman's, *Piaget: Psychologist of the Real*, 1977, for an excellent review of Piaget's assumptions.

⁷ Charles Brauner, *American Educational Theory*, 1964.

⁸ G.H. Mead, *On Social Psychology*, Chapter Four.

⁹ Albert Bandura, *Social Learning Theory*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1977, p.10.

¹⁰ J.A. Popp, "Significance and Utility," *Philosophy of Education*, 1971; "On the Autonomy of Educational Inquiry," *Educational Studies*, 1974; "Aim-Oriented Empiricism and Pedagogical Research," (forthcoming).

¹¹ I. Levi, *Gambling With Truth*, 1967; N. Maxwell, "The Rationality of Scientific Discovery," Parts I and II, *Philosophy of Science*, 1974, pp. 123-153 and pp. 247-295.

¹² J.A. Popp, "Aim-Oriented Empiricism," *op. cit.*

Origins of the Modern School System

The democratization of education took place for two reasons: to provide the modern state with enlightened citizens and to train an efficient work force. In the nineteenth century, political considerations predominated; educational reform went hand in hand with the broadening of the suffrage, the disestablishment of religion, and the establishment of republican institutions. Like these other innovations, the common school system grew out of the democratic revolution, which created a new type of citizenship based on equality before the law and limited government—a "government of laws, not men." The model citizen of early republican theory knew what his rights were and defended them from infringement by his fellow citizens and by the state. He could not be fooled by demagogues or overawed by the the learned obfuscations of professional wise men. Appeals to authority left him unimpressed. Always on the alert for forgery, he had, moreover, enough worldly wisdom about men's motives, understanding of the principles of critical reasoning, and skill in the use of language to detect intellectual fraud in whatever form it presented itself.

The Culture of Narcissism, American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations. Christopher Lasch. New York: W.W. Norton. 1978. p. 130.