Abstract

Jody Azzouni (2025) provides a generalization of use and mention errors by noting that they involve cases in which properties of a notation are conflated with properties of the objects the notation is about. He then argues that such use/mention conflations have resulted in significant errors, especially in epistemology. But are such conflations always problematic? Can they be avoided in some cases by the resources available to a given practice? And can they be crucial for some other practices, and not to be avoided at all? In this paper, I examine these issues and consider cases in which use/mention conflation can always be avoided, by invoking features of a given practice. This is the case of mathematical activity. I also scrutinize cases in which the conflation cannot, and should not, be prevented---on pain of disfiguring the practice in the first place. This is the case of the experience of watching films and its accompanying phenomenology. After discussing these cases, I conclude with a tentative suggestion about what may be a source of the problem that led epistemology astray. I submit that metaphysical reification may be a culprit. 

Keywords: Use and mention, mathematical notation, properties, inferential conception, phenomenology of film, perceptual imagination, use and mention

How to Cite:

Bueno, O., (2026) “Use and mention conflation: Sometimes avoidable, sometimes crucial”, Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 16(1). doi: https://doi.org/10.4148/biyclc.21680